Thursday, July 31, 2014

The Syrian Opposition's Quest for Air Defense Systems

i. Overview: A Gift for 'Eid

"As a gift for 'Eid," a video surfaced on YouTube featuring the 80 mm "Ababil" cannon, a new locally manufactured anti-aircraft artillery system in the hands of the Syrian opposition:



Credit goes to the Islamic Front Focus, among the first to spot and report the system.

 At approximately 4:20, the video lists weapon specifications:




Approximate translation:

Caliber: 80 mm
Role: Anti-aircraft and field artillery  
Range: 6,500 m (ceiling); 12,000 m at 45 degrees (ground target)
Time to manufacture: One month

Later, at 4:43, the video puts the price to build a single piece at $25,000.

I want to know where the rebels are getting the Ababil 80 mm projectiles. If the Ababil was not designed to fire an existing stock of 80 mm AAA shells, as for example for 80 mm Swedish Bofors or Yugoslav M28 guns, which may have shipped to Syria at some point, then what fuse system would locally manufactured shells deploy? 

Leaving an answer to that question for an update, let's consider other air defense systems deployed in Syria today, including weapons acquired abroad or looted internally, in addition to surface-to-surface artillery and air-to-air missiles modified to fill an air-defense role. Current opposition air-defense stocks reflect (1) a critical need to counter Assadist air-power, through conventional anti-aircraft weapons either acquired abroad or captured internally; and (2) a local weapons industry design current working to produce systems capable of targeting aircraft, through either locally manufactured, dedicated weapons like the Ababil, or modified, standard munitions and delivery systems.

I. Conventional Anti-Aircraft Systems: Buy, Steal, Beg
  
 Man-Portable Air Defense Systems and Light AAA
 
To counter regime air-power, the Syrian opposition diligently worked to buy, steal, and internationally beg for as many anti-aircraft systems as possible. So however queasy the US may be at the idea of arming Syrian rebels with man-portable air-defense systems post MH17, significant open-source evidence proves the proliferation of a range of highly lethal anti-aircraft devices in Syria since conflict onset, from first-generation Russian SA-7's and the very popular second-generation SA-16's, seen here, here, and here, to the more advanced third-generation Chinese FN-6, seen here and here. Sources allegedly include Qatar via Sudan, with many weapons coming from looted Assadist stores and ambushed field units, as noted here and here.  

Mid last year, a YouTube account belonging to the Authenticity and Development Front uploaded a lovely family portrait of some of the more widely deployed MANPADS in Syria, from the SA-7 and SA-18 (a less advanced machine than the SA-16), to the more capable SA-24 and  FN-6 missiles:



 The original video:





An approximate translation of the air-defense brigade discussion:

 Cameraman: We're with the commander of the (inaudible) artillery brigade, Aleppo. Tell me about the brigade and (inaudible).

Commander 1: Of course (inaudible), these guys are from tank, (inaudible), air defense, and artillery brigades .... from a number of brigades. Let's take a small tour of the brigades we've got here ... here's the air defense brigade. We've got fixed (truck mounted) machine guns, 12.7 mm and 23 mm (cannons), and a number of missiles. This is the mujaheddin brigade commander, Anas Saleh.

Cameraman: Salam 'alaykum -

Commander 2: Wa 'alaykum as-salam...(inaudible)

Cameraman: (Talking over Commander 2) - Tell me about the air defense brigade.

Commander 2: This is the Muheb Ketibat al-Hamze air defense brigade, which includes a number of ground-based counter measures, from "DShK," to 14.5 mm, and 23 mm machine guns and cannons, in addition to missiles, we've got missiles like the Igla SA-18, the S-10, and the second-generation Igla, of course the "Kobra," which is used against helicopters, while the Igla is used against MIGs, and any other warplanes."
  
As frankly confused as our Commander 2 may be (the accused SA-18 looks much more like an SA-16, while the local term "Kobra" usually refers to the decidedly first rather than second-generation SA-7), we see a range of deployed MANPADS, alongside light AAA.

For an idea of when the specifically man-portable anti-aircraft threat appeared in Syria, the below Google map lists the location, date, and incident description of first-generation SA-7 missile proliferation early in the war:



Ground-based Surface to Air Missile Systems

By early to mid-2013, in addition to light AAA and MANPADS, the Syrian opposition may have also captured and fielded several SA-2 and SA-8 GECKO SAMs, as seen here, here, and here.

Captured SA-8


Site of captured SA-2 in the Aleppo Countryside

II. Locally Manufactured Air Defenses: If They Don't Come, Build It

To supplement limited supplies of conventionally developed and acquired anti-aircraft systems, enter Syria's now famously ingenious workshop weaponeers. Since sophisticated IR guidance systems of even first-generation man and vehicle-portable air-defense systems are probably beyond the manufacturing expertise of local builders, initial designs include unguided multi-barrel rocket launchers (although the below featured battery may actually be an SSM system, considering what looks like an attempt to aim it with an iPhone compass), and plans to modify successful surface-to-surface guns like the Hell Cannon.

Credit to the Atlantic: "DIY Weapons of the Syrian Rebels," 2013.
A scaled-down, simplified Katyusha SSM battery, or an air-defense system?

Early last year, a video surfaced featuring the Hell Cannon creator, Abu Nadim, explaining experiments modifying the heavy gun to an AAA system:



At 2:20, the approximate translation reads:
 
Commentator: Abu Nadim spends most of his time conducting new experiments. He has succeeded in creating an effective anti-aircraft weapon, which downs Assad's airplanes. After several attempts, a scaled-down experiment to develop and fire a SAM using a locally manufactured guidance system succeeded. However, according to Abu Nadim, he needs the cooperation of opposition factions and brigades to move the idea to the production phase.

Abu Nadim: I've conducted experiments, and succeeded, thanks be to God, to modify a projectile about the size of an artillery shell, or a bit bigger, or even a Grad rocket, to reach a plane and explode. There are a lot of brigades, they've got Grad SAMs, and God willing, I'll be able to modify those to a surface to air missile, and soon .... But it will take a lot of time, and we also don't really see much interest in the subject on behalf of local brigades. If there's an interest, we'll make them.

Although I have yet to see a modified Grad targeting planes, I don't put anything past the inventiveness of Syria's local weapons manufacturing industry. Mid-last year, a video surfaced showing what looks like an AAM modified to fill both a SAM and SSM role:  



The original video:



Other media appearing about the same time shows what looks to be a modified Russian Molniya R-60 AAM:

The modified AAM

Compare to a Russian R60 AAM
What thus emerges is a two-fold strategy on the part of the Syrian opposition, to (1) obtain conventionally developed and manufactured air-defense systems, however possible, ranging from traditional light and heavy AAA, to more advanced man and vehicle-portable heat-seeking missile systems; and (2) build new tools, like the Ababil, or modify existing locally or conventionally manufactured weapons like the Hell Cannon, and the Russian R60 AAM, to fill a SAM role. Regime birds, although by no means neutralized, are certainly less safe.