The Fall of al-Tabqa Airbase Part II: Fighter Accounts

After the fall of Syrian Army Base 93, and later, the al-Tabqa Airbase, the Islamic State terrorist-insurgency released video statements from fighters involved in both operations.





I. Approximate translations
  
Video 1: "A Video Tour Inside al-Tabqa Military Airport in Raqqa After its Liberation // The Islamic State"

Screen: 

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

A video tour inside the al-Tabqa military airbase after its liberation.
   
Fighter: 

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. Prayers and peace be upon our lord Mohammed, the seal of the prophets and the messengers. By the will and at the order of Allah the Almighty and Most High, the Islamic State conquered the 17th brigade, the 21st regiment, and the 91st brigade. 

The order came from Riyad al-Harb, of the Islamic State, to prepare to storm the al-Tabqa military airport. 

We began with reconnaissance, led by soldiers from the Islamic State Army, the might of the State, rreconnaissance by land, and by air, using (unmanned) aerial vehicles.
  
Thanks be to Allah, the Almighty and Most High, we prepared the attack, and laid siege to the airport from its four sides. Then, after three days of siege, we stormed the airport. 

The operation proceeded in stages. 

The first stage was taking the airplane barrier, a solid barrier, the first to be captured.

Then we began, then in the second stage, we took the main gate, which is the airport's most important gate, for taking out (heavy guns) to hit al-Tabqa City.

Cameraman: This is the gate of the airport, after the Islamic State gained control of it ... remnants of (inaudible). Here are the tanks of the Nusairi pigs. 

Fighter:

And after that ... after two days, we prepared ourselves for the big raid, which was the storming of the airport's general headquarters. 

Then, the soldiers of the Islamic State, thanks be to Allah, the Almighty and Most High, undertook the raid, a successful raid, that lead to the complete liberation of the airport, thanks be to Allah, the Almighty and Most High.

These are the planes, which Allah, the Almighty and Most High, granted to us through our conquest. We've turned these spoils, captured from the unbelievers, from weapons used to destroy Muslims, to kill women and children, to weapons in the hands of the Islamic State.

Cameraman: Allah is Greatest, and Glory be to Allah. These are planes of the Nusairi regime, that were used to kill Muslims, now spoils of the Islamic State.

Video 2: "Islamic State Fighting with the Army"

First fighter:

(Reciting Surat Al-'Anfal):

"O you who believe, when you meet those who disbelieve in battle, do not turn your backs to them [in flight]. 

And whoever turns his back to them on such a day, unless swerving [as a strategy] for war or joining [another] company, has certainly returned with anger [upon him] from Allah , and his refuge is Hell - and wretched is the destination.

And you did not kill them, but it was Allah who killed them. And you threw not, [O Muhammad], when you threw, but it was Allah who threw that He might test the believers with a good test. Indeed, Allah is Hearing and Knowing."

Screen: The Battle to Liberate the 93rd Brigade, Raqqa State

Fighter 1: (Pointing to map, audibly non-native Arabic speaker) You all enter from here. Three groups. You are to provide help to your brothers, who are waiting here ... yes. 

Fighter 2: Tracks -

Fighter 1: (Talking over fighter 2) There are ... "tracks" ... so they must be (inaudible) present. And "tracks" also come directly from this second road here, to the, the ... 

Fighter 2: - Headquarters. 

Fighter 1: (Pointing at map center) The headquarters. Okay? Here, advance, comb (the area), then second, (inaudible) at the headquarters.

II. Comments

In our first video, we can verify the alleged course of battle, and filmed base scenes, using Google Earth and Panoramio.

In our second video, although the surveilled base matches Google Earth imagery, it is impossible to tell whether IS actually launched a reconnaissance drone, or simply discovered existing military or commercial flyover imagery.

The Fall of Al Tabqa Airbase Part 1: IS Drone Footage?

The Islamic State claims to have deployed advanced reconnaissance techniques to plan its successful offensive against the al-Tabqa airbase, which fell on August 24.

As early as September 7, a video emerged on YouTube of purported IS drone surveillance of the ill-fated airbase:



This is not the first time IS has allegedly deployed a surveillance drone. As early as August 23, a video was uploaded on YouTube of an IS drone over Syrian Army Base 93 in Raqqa.


   
A comparison of unique structures and paths in alleged IS drone footage with Google Earth tentatively verifies that both the al-Tabqa airbase, and Syrian Army Base 93, were surveilled by an aerial reconnaissance vehicle.

1. al-Tabqa Air Base

Alleged IS Drone Footage:

Google Earth:
 

2. Syrian Army Base 93

Alleged IS Drone Footage:

Google Earth:

 

But was either base indeed surveilled by an IS UAV, or has IS simply discovered and edited existing commercial or military flyover footage?

Syria's DIY Katyushas: The Jaljalat and Arrow of Islam

Previously we looked at the locally manufactured Sham Freedom missile, and considered its more effective use as truck-mounted rocket artillery.

At least two truck-mounted, locally manufactured Katyushas have been documented in Syria since 2013:

1. The Jaljlat 

Manufacturer: The Umma Brigade 
Launcher Tube Diameter: ~ 130 - 120 mm
Launcher Tube Length: ~ 3.5 m
Magazine: 14 rockets
First appearance: April, 2013

We can start with some basic Google SketchUp pixel measurements to get an idea of Jaljlat rocket diameter and length.

 

 If we assume the measured frame bar is 2" or 50 mm square tubing, we arrive at diameter = (1365/575)*50.8 = 120.4 mm and length = (41590/576) = 3,668 mm.  

As these measures are quite similar to that of a 122 mm Grad, could we be looking at a locally manufactured launcher, using conventionally produced Grad rockets?

A video on the Jaljlat, titled "Statement by the Umma Brigade on the Locally Manufactured Jaljlat Grad Rocket Launcher," uploaded April 30, 2013, claims the system is indeed intended to launch Grad rather than locally manufactured rockets.



Approximate video translation:

Operator:

In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful. Praise be to the Lord of the Worlds, and prayers and peace upon Mohamed, the liege of the Mujahedin. 

Said, the Most High: "And prepare against them what you may of your forces and tethered steeds, and terrorize the enemies of Allah, and your enemies." Believe in Almighty God.

This is the Jaljlat launcher, manufactured by the Ummah Brigade, by the hero mujahedin, to strike the Assadist gangs, wherever they are, and wherever they encamp. 

And we are, in this brigade, ready to assist all other brigades, to build launchers like this one, to strike al-Assad's gangs, wherever they are, and wherever they encamp. 

God is Greatest, God is Greatest, and Glory be to God.


2. The Arrow of Islam

While the Jaljlt appears to launch conventional military munitions, the Arrow of Islam launcher appears to fire the locally manufactured Islam 3 rocket, seen also here.

Manufacture:  The Brigade of Islam
Missile Diameter: ~150 mm
Missile Length:  ~ 3,000 - 3,500 mm
Magazine: 3 with a two missile reload
First appearance: September, 2013



The launch vehicle may be a Ural-4320, a common vehicle in the Syrian Army inventory.
 
We start by searching our photographs for a known measurement to compare missile dimensions against. Schematics put the Ural-4320 vehicle tire width at 500 mm. A spare is 470 mm.

 

Using the 500 mm tire width schematic measure as a reference in our second photograph, a quick SketchUp measure puts the Islam 3 missile diameter at ~150 mm. Next, the approximately 2,200 mm tire-to-tire measure means the missile body approaches ~ 3,000 mm. And if we assume the missile length is actually closer to the full measure of the Ural-4320 bed length, it grows to ~3,500 mm. 
 
To however approach the reported range of "60 km," the Islam 3 would need to be closer in dimensions to a Fadjr-5, with a 75 km range. With a 333 mm diameter, the Fadjr-5 is much larger. A locally manufactured weapon approaching the range of a Fadjr-series projectile would indeed be an impressive feat, and may be accomplished with a lighter payload.

 

 

The Syrian Qassam Part IV: The Lions of Allah Sham Freedom Missile Accuracy and Final Assessment

Accuracy Continued and Final Assessment

For simplicity, let’s start by targeting only the section of the Army Chief of Staff building seen ablaze in Part III, which may be measured in Google Earth at around 45 x 17.5 m.

To also include hits collapsing the outer façade of the building, let’s look at what range the blast of an 8 kg TNT warhead may destroy concrete, which generally requires 10 - 15 psi of blast overpressure.

 The relationship between warhead size and lethal radius may be expressed as follows:

 R_L = D x W^1/3

Where RL is the lethal radius of the warhead, W is the size of the warhead in kilograms, and D is the lethal radius for a 1 kg TNT warhead (for 15 psi, approximately 3 meters). Thus, R_L = 3 * 8^1/3, or 6 meters. 

We can therefore add 12 meters to the effective length and width of the target, arriving at 57 x 29.5 m, which covers an area of 1,681.5 m². 

Finally, for targeting, let’s convert the building area to a circle of equal area, yielding a radius of about 23.13 m.

To determine the probability of a direct hit, or single shot kill (SSK) probability, we may consider the following formula, taken from "Missile Accuracy (CEP)," an excerpt from "Statistical Snacks":

p_ssk  = 1 – e ( -0.41 · R² / CEP² )           

Plugging in (1) missile CEP and (2) target radius, we arrive at:

p_ssk = 1 – e ( -0.41 · 23.13²/ 100²) = 0.0217 = ~2.2%

So, even if we generously assume the respectable 100 m CEP of an Iranian Fateh A110, the Sham Freedom missile SSK probability against a facility-sized target is little more than 2%, a far cry from the claimed 80%. 

To achieve that kind of SSK probability against the same target, the Sham Freedom missile would require a CEP of ~11.5 m –on par with some of the most advanced guided artillery rocket systems in the world.

So how many Sham Freedom missiles would it take to strike the Army Chief of Staff building?

Now we may evaluate the utility of a 500 unit Sham Freedom missile arsenal against facility sized targets.

To begin, the probability of missing the Chief of Staff building with a single Sham Freedom missile is 1 – 0.0217 = 0.978 = 97.8%. 

The probability of a miss occurring say ten times in a row is .978 to the tenth, or 0.8, with a hit occurring 1 - 0.8 = 0.2, or 20% of the time.

And if we launch more?


A salvo of half the reported Lions of Allah arsenal, or 250 Sham Freedom missiles, will achieve a strike against the section of the Army Chief of Staff building measured previously with a probability of 1 - (.978¹⁰⁰) = 0.89%.  To strike the Chief of Staff building with an acceptable 75% probability, the Lions of Allah would need about 62 missiles.

Here’s the fine print:

Previously, we selected the extraordinarily generous CEP of a guided Iranian Fateh A110. If we consider a more plausible, yet still optimistic CEP of around 500 m, which would be about the same as a Russian 9K52 Luna artillery rocket, the Lions of Allah would need to launch about 1,580 Sham Freedom missiles to achieve a single strike against the Chief of Staff building with ~75% probability. If we bump up the CEP to the neighborhood of a North Korean Hwasong 6, at around 1,000 m, the Lions of Allah would need to fire around 6,335 Sham Freedom missiles to hit the Chief of Staff building just once, 75% of the time.

Ultimately, I doubt the Sham Freedom missile boasts a CEP any less than the Qassam II rocket, universally known as an inaccurate terror weapon at best.  

III. Final Performance Assessment: Claims Evaluation and Actual Utility

For a recap, here's our evaluation of the source claims:

•   Range: Tentatively confirmed at approximately 7 km with an 8 kg payload, given a relatively efficient rocket motor. For a sanity check, the similar sized, locally manufactured Palestinian Qassam II rocket has a range of 10 km with a 5 kg warhead.  A simulation using only a 5 kg warhead extends the Sham Freedom missile range to ~8,500 m. 

•   Quantity: The Lions of Allah may certainly have 500 units. But such a capability means little if the intended targets are relatively small facilities. However, a 500 unit arsenal may be more useful in other roles, as will be explored below.

•   Accuracy: If the unqualified accuracy of "80%" was referring to SSK probability for a facility sized target, then that's almost certainly disproved. And frankly, calculations were not required. A quick sanity check with a Qassam II will tell that locally manufactured, unguided missiles are only good for terror, propaganda, and perhaps indiscriminate area coverage.


Does that mean that unguided rockets like the Sham Freedom missile are useless to the Syrian opposition? Not at all.


First, they serve as a useful propaganda and terror tool, especially during the early to mid-stages of the Syrian civil war, when more sophisticated, conventionally manufactured SSM were hard to come by. That a rag-tag opposition brigade could assemble the expertise, material, and safe haven to produce relatively advanced locally manufactured arms like the Sham Freedom missile is impressive, especially if delivered in quantity on regime-held positions and neighborhoods, even if inaccurately. 


Second, this analysis considered a facility sized target. But if the Lions of Allah brigade instead used Sham Freedom missiles en masse, similar to a Russian truck-mounted Katyusha battery, they may be more useful. Indeed, what look like locally manufactured truck-mounted Katyusha batteries have been snapped in Syria:

These kind of truck-mounted, mass-barrage systems are very effective for raining long-range death quickly. A salvo could be launched in minutes, with the missile crew evacuating the launch site immediately.

In the second shot, we see the "Islam 3" missile. Sources claim a "60 km range" and "85% accuracy." These capabilities may be evaluated using methods described in Parts I - IV of this post. However, if the Islam 3 is deployed as truck-mounted rocket artillery, it may  provide a more effective, tactically useable system, as opposed to single launches that do not achieve the kind of barrage density necessary to make up for lack of missile accuracy.

The Syrian Qassam Part III: The Lion's of Allah Sham Freedom Missile Accuracy and Geolocating Targets

Accuracy: CEP and Target Size

To verify the unqualified statement that the Sham Freedom missile strikes targets with “80% accuracy,” we need at least two bits of information:

First, missile accuracy is generally expressed in terms of Circular Error Probable (CEP), or the radius of a circle in which 50% of the missiles are expected to fall. 

Second, we need the dimensions of likely Sham Freedom missile targets: Are we talking about a facility, or an artillery position? 

As we have no information on Sham Freedom missile CEP, we may consider other weapons with known CEP, like the Iranian Fateh A-110. This would yield a respectable CEP of only a 100 m, establishing an upper performance bound.

The video title in Part I gives us a target: The Army Chief of Staff building in Damascus.

An initial Google image search yields the following first interesting frame associated with an attack on the Army Chief of Staff building, the Arabic in red reading “the targeted building” (top), and the “Dedeman” (bottom).

Opening Google Earth, we quickly locate the Dedeman Hotel in Damascus, precisely matching the first returned image.

Searching further, we find that the Dedeman Hotel has been renamed the “Dama Rose” hotel, with the Haaretz confirming an attack on the Dama Rose in November of 2012. The article also notes the blast only occurred near, rather than struck the Army Chief of Staff building, approximately 500 m away.

Turning to social media, a forum post on November 6, 2013 puts the Army Chief of Staff building slightly west, near al-Amaween square, this time directly mentioning an FSA rocket attack, coinciding approximately with the date of the Sham Freedom missile taped launch analyzed in this article.

The back of which is about 500 m from the Dama Rose Hotel blast, as reported by Haaretz.

Other media notes the Army Chief of Staff building has been targeted and struck multiple times, since at least September of 2012. Here, we see what looks like the building identified in Google Earth as the Army Chief of Staff building, with flames and smoke pouring out of its windows, photographed from across al-Amaween square:

And although media from as late as mid this year report mortar fire in the vicinity of the Army Chief of Staff building, report photographs capture the remains of what look like a locally manufactured missile, reported to have killed two civilians and injured others:

But just how likely is it that the FSA and related brigades like the Lions of Allah are targeting and striking facility sized targets with locally manufactured missiles?