The Syrian Qassam Part II: The Lion's of Allah Sham Freedom Missile Range and Quantity

II. Verifying Sham Freedom Missile Capabilities: Range, Quantity, Accuracy

Range

We start by plugging in the missile dimensions we had approximated in Part I of this blogpost into OpenRocket, a rocket flight simulation program:

To approximate weapon weight, I assume an all-steel body, and an 8 kg TNT warhead, as noted in forum posts on similar locally manufactured missiles, and about the same as the Qassam II. 

For the missile motor, I select a Contrail Rockets O6300. 

Although OpenRocket is designed to model civilian model rockets, the CR O6300 total impulse, or the aggregate of force impacted by the engine over its burn time, is within 30% of a 122 mm Grad. 

To establish a performance ceiling of the Sham Freedom missile, we may therefore assume an efficient rocket motor in the vicinity of a military grade weapon, which OpenRocket handily models. This is the same conclusion arrived at by citizen journalists in the  "Who Attacked Ghouta?" blogspot when estimating UMLACA rocket range during the Damascus gas attacks.

We assume average weather conditions, and the previously determined launch angle of 58.54. Our flight simulation yields a range of approximately 7 km, as reported by our missile source, thereby tentatively confirming the Sham Freedom missile claimed range.

Quantity

Unfortunately, other claims regarding Sham Freedom Missile capabilities, i.e. a strike accuracy of “80%,” and a “500” unit stockpile, are more difficult to verify.

Starting with the easier of the two claims, whether the Lions of Allah have 1 or a 1,000 missiles depends on brigade funding, expertise, and manpower allocated to missile production, none of which may be immediately verified.

Yet if warhead storage issues forced blockaded HAMAS to assemble battlefield quantity Qassam I and II arsenals in only a few weeks, then perhaps a well-funded brigade in Syria, with comparatively prodigious construction material and many out of work engineers and metal workers to draw from, could just as well build several hundred Sham Freedom missiles within three years, if they began development and construction in 2011.

Unverifiable hypotheticals aside, let’s look at the problem another way: If we are to instead focus on the probable accuracy of the Sham Freedom missile, then we may understand just what missile unit numbers operationally mean. That is, if the Sham Freedom missile is so inaccurate that it takes hundreds of units to damage or destroy a single target with for example 75% confidence, then its battle field value is limited to terror and propaganda, and a 500 unit arsenal is about an order of magnitude short to make a real impact. 

With that in mind, what can we deduce in Part III about Sham Freedom missile accuracy, and what will missile accuracy mean for how seriously we take claims of a few hundred unit stockpile?